Eastern Europe: nation-state versus empire
History, in its real or doctored version, is a vital factor in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. History was even one of the main reasons given by Russia when it declared war in 2022. However, history according to Vladimir Putin, President and Historian (two terms only applicable with a dose of sarcasm) or “President and History-maker” (Putin has repeatedly portrayed himself as a man on a historical mission), has remained the same since his speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, reiterated in his essay “On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, published in 2021. It is fundamental to the ideology behind not only Russian propaganda but also its pop culture, a recurrent theme in its music, films and visual arts.
The purpose of the following analysis is to outline a few historical facts garnered from the descriptions, explanations and writings of a number of reputed historians. As discussions continue on the potential outcome of the conflict and the effects of a Russian victory or capitulation on Europe’s eastern borders, we are conscious of the need for an analysis of this type. The assumption underlying our analysis is that Putin’s Russia is a sort of reincarnation of the old imperial days. It follows that the Russian nation cannot be considered a nation in the sense of a nation-state[1].
From empire to modern European state
In 1918, it seemed that the age of empires had come to an end with the fall of four of their number, two in Europe (Austria-Hungary and Prussia), one in Eurasia (tsarist Russia) and the last to the East (Ottoman Empire). From the ashes of these empires emerged new states, some short-lived, others more permanent, born of wars and revolutions.
For Roman Szporluk, professor of history at Harvard University and author of many essays on modern nations, creating a new nation will inevitably impact on another nation. When nations embark on a process of self-determination, they tend to assert their national identity by seeking to distance themselves from the empires of which they were formerly part. This is what occurred throughout Central Europe: in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, to name but a few. Therefore, adopting Czech nationality meant refusing to remain German, choosing Slovak nationality was tantamount to ceasing to be Hungarian and Romanian, and identifying as Ukrainian meant ceasing to be Polish or Russian. These sorts of decisions are deliberate and brave, but also have inevitable repercussions on the former nations.
In addition, during the period between the two World Wars, many independent states arose from the ashes of empires in Europe, each with its arsenal of memories of the past, its heroes and martyrs, preconceptions and ambitions, all faced with the new scenario of achieving peace in Europe and among their own peoples. Most of these states, considered cultural nations according to Gellner’s definition, were aspiring to become nation-states, whilst the others had ambitions to become political nations, again according to Gellner. Basically, this meant that these nations sought to maintain and affirm their identity through their language, their traditions and their culture. The challenges of creating a new state were often exacerbated by wars and shifting national boundaries.
Historic legacies also played an important part in the development of national policies. The region saw the revival of ancient historical or mythical references: the Kingdom of Hungary, the Kingdom of Bohemia, the two-nation Respublica[2], the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the Cossack Republic, etc. The ambitions and political relations forged by the fledgling states were fuelled by this nostalgia for the past. In addition, the individual states had to find their place in a Europe still emerging from the war, where potential intra-continental alliances were under serious consideration in a bid to create a new, younger, and more forward-looking society, hallmarked by pan-Europeanism, pan-Slavism, pacifism in some cases, militarism in others.
Eastern and central European countries all had to find a way of coming to terms with their past as part of empires or different nations, or as fragmented entities spread across different territories[3]. Two closely linked factors marked their political and cultural development as nations: a desire to express their national identity and an attachment to Europe, its history and culture.
Politically Europe was constructed not only on the rule of law but also on the belief that not only do citizens have a duty toward their homeland (be it an empire, a monarchy or a republic), but that the state also has obligations towards its citizens. Neither of these founding principles applied in the Russian Empire, where human beings were not subjects but merely the object of imperial policies. This aspect will be addressed in greater detail in the section on contemporary Russia, where this antiquated approach remains to an even greater extent a vital part of the country’s fabric. By contrast with Russia, in Ukraine, particularly the area to the east known as the Cossack Republic, there were already signs in the 17th and 18th centuries of an awareness of the political principles in force in Europe on the part of the Cossack elite when they first demanded that the Polish king and, later, that the Russian tsar respect their rights. From studies undertaken by Roman Szporluk and Serhiy Plokhiy it would appear that it was then that the beginnings of Ukraine as a European nation, as yet not in its modern form, first emerged. It was in the Cossack Republic or Cossack Hetmanate, in other words the east and not the west of Ukraine, that an embryonic national political and intellectual elite, and finally a clearly delimited territory, began to take shape on the basis of military experience.
History is of course based on things remembered but also on things forgotten. Modern nations can only emerge if they are able to rise above and put behind them a whole range of factors. For Roman Szporluk, a nation can only enter the modern era if it can overcome its religious issues, in other words when the nation matters more than religious differences, whence the need to forget. In Central Europe, the Polish Republic welcomed Ukrainian Uniates from Galicia, Protestants or Lutherans without demanding they give up their religions. The same applied in Czechoslovakia, where religious issues and the secular state were the source of major debate. [4]
All in all, in Central Europe, efforts to create modern European nations focused on the dual target of modernisation and confirmation of their European identity.
Contemporary Russia and the issue of empire
The war currently raging in Ukraine begged the old dilemma faced by nations of whether to opt for peace, albeit illusory, or to resist. Nations have to decide one way or another for themselves. A number of authors have pointed out that the choice is societal, since war is a battle between civilisations. For the Ukrainian nation, constantly resisting Russia’s expansionist culture, its anti-modern civilisation and its Asian orientation, the only answer was fighting back. While the Ukrainians are united in resisting the Russian invader and, by choosing to align with Europe, exert an influence on domestic and foreign policy, the Russians have let Russia to remain an enfeebled and unpredictable empire, where decisions are made by a political elite and ordinary people are denied freedom of speech and any form of resistance is summarily quelled or obliterated.
While Europe’s empires disappeared in 1918, in Russia it has been reincarnated on more than one occasion. This empire, with its vast territory spanning Europe and Asia, has undergone a series of metamorphoses since the early 20th century. The first of these was its decline following the failure of its military foray against Japan, the October Revolution and the fall of the empire in 1918. In 1922, the empire was rebuilt on the ruins of the old world to create a new international proletarian society in the form of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Nationalism was central to Soviet imperial renaissance. The USSR rapidly absorbed all the neighbouring nations, despite strong protests that posed a real threat to this heir to the Russian Empire. These protests came from nations such as the Baltic States, Finland, and Ukraine, where political and military awareness was already strong. To form this conglomerate of nations, the central authority of the USSR rode roughshod over its opponents. Despite obliterating nations through forced assimilation, uprooting peoples by deportation, populist proletarian discourse, the Holodomor and ethnic cleansing, the USSR has been unable to resolve its national dilemma. By promoting the Russian people as a model or centralised nation, the Communist authorities introduced a dominant-subordinate paradigm doomed to end in bloodbath.
Russia has still not resolved the issue of its borders. The Russian world (Russkiy mir) is still fundamental to Putin’s rhetoric, as he sets out on his conquest well beyond his national frontiers. The following anecdote is illustrative of his state of mind. In 2006, during a Russian talk show, Vladimir Putin questioned a young boy about Russia’s borders. Intimidated, the boy, stuttered out an answer: “Our borders stop at the United States…”. With great satisfaction, a smiling Putin replied: “Our borders stop nowhere”. This is now the catchphrase on the posters plastered across the streets throughout Russia.
Although the end of the Great War in 1918 may have seen the end of empires and the rise of new independent states, one empire fought desperately for survival by adopting different forms while remaining wedded to its existential beliefs: the Soviet Union, now Russia. While the independent states founded during the interwar period embarked on the far-reaching changes required to become nation-states, Bolshevist Russia continued unceasingly with its campaign to conquer new states and bring them into its fold, in the hope of recreating the territory of the tsarist empire.
Today, Vladimir Putin blithely manipulates history to deny the very existence of the Ukrainian nation. According to his version of history, it is Lenin who created Ukraine. While he may be partly right, he has conveniently forgotten one small detail, poor historian that he is, namely that Lenin created the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, not the Ukrainian nation, which already existed before. Similarly, the great communist leader created the Republic of Russia and other parts of the USSR.
The collapse of the USSR left Russia with a deep sense of nostalgia and defeat. The Russian President embodies the desire to restore a Russia that is misunderstood and humiliated, surrounded by enemies and threats, to its former glory. His imperialist aspirations are driving the country to the brink of ruin. Disorientated and gagged into silence, the population is now nothing more than a deeply anguished mass of human beings desperately looking for a purpose, a state of affairs often conducive to war.
The end of history or the end of empires?
Francis Fukuyama’s book The End of History and the Last Man is repeatedly quoted in the debate over the current Russian war. Yet this debate is nothing new. It is one of a long series of questions raised by Hegel, among others, and several phenomenologists, in Vladimir Soloviev’s philosophy or Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, both published in 1922. It also features in the works of Alexandre Kojève, for whom history ended with the abolition of the class system, using the United States as his example, or of Francis Fukuyama, who saw the end of history in the triumph of economic liberalism and the fall of the Iron Curtain. Today, in 2023, new intellectual theories about the end of a great historical period and the start of a new era are only to be expected, not least in Europe, where echoes of the past are twofold with the return of high-intensity warfare and the reemergence of the last empire on Europe’s doorstep.
Let us conclude with a few historical facts. Firstly, an empire needs to be democratic to consolidate the nations that make it up, but democracy is also a threat to the very existence of that empire. Secondly, when an empire falls, there is always a war, and no empire has ever survived warfare. In 1991, Europe rejoiced in the fact that the last empire had fallen without a war on Soviet territory. Sadly, the logic of history came back to bite us on 24 February 2022.
A century later, Russia has resumed its journey on the route mapped out by the Bolsheviks, via local military invasions and the destruction of independent states. Once again, it has unleashed a series of invasions and brought pressure to bear in an attempt to win back its lost territories: the Caucasus, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and finally Ukraine. While it would be wonderful to perceive Russia as a nation-state, sadly this would be an illusion, given that it is, in fact, an empire-state seeking reincarnation.
Nathalie de Kaniv, historian, member of the Board of EuroDéfense-France
[1] This subject is addressed by historians such as Yaroslav Hrytsak, Serhiy Plokhiy, and Timothy Snyder in their various talks and publications. The issue of empire and nation is also analysed on the basis of major research conducted by Ukrainian and American historians at Harvard, Lviv and Yale Universities.
[2] Ukrainian historiography argues that Ruthenia was part of the Respublica (Rzeczpospolita)
[3] This theme is addressed in a number of publications, notably those of Michel Bernard and Catherine Horel.
[4] See BOROWIK Irena and TOMKA Miklós (2001), Religion and Social Change in Post-Communist Europe. Kraków, Nomos. See also Alfred Baudrillart’s notes on the religious context in Czechoslovakia in the 1920s: CHRISTOPHE Paul (2003), Les carnets du cardinal Baudrillart, 1919-1921 and 1928-1932. Paris, Cerf.
Translated by ISIT Paris students, as part of their 2023-2024 Master project, and edited by Ms. Christine Cross
Eastern Europe: nation-state versus empire
